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ABSTRACT: We have analyzed the be-
haviour of primary fiscal balance and 
public debt in Serbia before and in the af-
termath of the global financial crisis. The 
results of our analysis are: i) public debt to 
GDP ratioexhibits (near) unit root behav-
iour with an overall upward time trend; ii) 
the response of primary fiscal balance to 
public debt has been insufficient to mean 
revert the upward trend in government 
debt; iii) the efforts of the Serbian govern-
ment to repay the debt principal after the 
fiscal rule breach have not been persistent, 
providing empirical support to the fiscal fa-
tigue hypothesis; iv) the government budget 
constraint has deteriorated since the begin-
ning of the global financial crisis; v) the re-
sponse of primary fiscal balance to public 
debt from the onset of the global financial 
crisis has dropped more severely in com-
parison to other European economies.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we analyse the behaviour of primary fiscal balance and public debt 
in Serbia before and during the global financial crisis. Our analysis addresses 
four main research questions. First, does the trajectory of public-debt-to-GDP 
ratio satisfy government budget constraint, i.e., is the Serbian public-debt-to-
GDP ratio sustainable? Second, does primary fiscal balance respond to public 
debt accumulation? Third, is the behaviour of the Serbian government 
consistent with the fiscal fatigue hypothesis? Fourth, has the budget constraint 
of the Serbian government deteriorated more since the beginning of the global 
financial crisis? 
The results of our analysis are: i) the trajectory of public-debt-to-GDP ratio 
exhibits (near) unit root behaviour with an overall upward time trend, i.e., the 
Serbian public-debt-to-GDP ratio is unsustainable; ii) the response of primary 
fiscal balance to public debt accumulation has been insufficient to mean revert 
the upward trend in government debt; iii) the efforts of the Serbian government 
to repay the debt principal after the fiscal rule breach have not been persistent, 
providing empirical support for the fiscal fatigue hypothesis; and iv) the 
government budget constraint has deteriorated since the beginning of the global 
financial crisis as from its onset the response of primary fiscal balance to public 
debt accumulation has dropped more severely than in other European 
economies. 
Our analysis covers the period from 2004Q3 to 2014Q3, so it does not take into 
account the fiscal consolidation package initiated in 2014Q4. In analysing the 
behaviour of primary fiscal balance and public debt in Serbia we complement 
the use of unit root tests with ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of fiscal 
reaction functions (FRFs). We estimate a broad range of FRFs, both linear and 
non-linear, with particular emphasis on the structural break due to the global 
financial crisis. 
Our empirical estimates add several contributions to the existing body of 
knowledge on the behaviour of primary fiscal balance and public debt. First, our 
research is one of the first papers to analyse the behaviour of primary fiscal 
balance and public debt in the case of Serbia. We present a detailed single 
country study using time series data, while most other studies in the literature 
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utilize panel data sets, due to the relatively short time coverage for transition 
economies. Second, we detect a change in the fiscal behaviour of the Serbian 
government following a fiscal rule breach. The government took corrective 
action, but the effort was insufficient to reverse the upward trajectory of public 
debt. Third, the Serbian government is one of the rare European governments 
that has not implemented fiscal consolidation measures from the onset of the 
global financial crisis, at least in the period we analyse. The estimates of FRFs 
with breakpoints show how the budget constraint of the Serbian government 
deteriorated more heavily than in other European economies. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II acquaints the reader with 
major trends in Serbian public finances before and during the global financial 
crisis. Section III derives the government budget constraint. Section IV presents 
the results of the unit root tests. Section V outlines our empirical estimates of 
FRFs, and Section VI concludes.  
2. DATA AND TRENDS 
Our empirical analysis covers the period between 2004Q3 and 2014Q3, so it 
does not take into account the fiscal consolidation package initiated in 2014Q4. 
Two distinctive sub-periods characterize our sample span: the first covers the 
period from 2004Q3 to 2008Q3 and the second covers the period from 2008Q4 
to 2014Q3.  
In the first sub-period the public-debt-to-GDP ratio declined by approximately 
30 percentage points. Between 2002 and 2005 the government, supported by the 
IMF’s Extended Arrangement, carried out a fiscal consolidation package of over 
5% of GDP (Cocozza et al. 2011), recording a fiscal surplus in 2005. In addition, 
externally fuelled rapid economic growth, absorption-gap-caused buoyancy in 
government revenues, and debt write-offs by the Paris and London club of 
creditors pushed government debt as a percentage of GDP further downward. 
Between 2006 and 2008 the government, funded by massive privatization 
revenues, embarked on a journey of procyclical fiscal expansion. The adoption 
of a five-year National Investment Plan, public sector wage increases, and a cut 
in the marginal tax rate on wages accompanied by an increase in non-taxable 
wage threshold created a structural fiscal imbalance in Serbian public finances 
in this two-year period. In 2008 the Serbian government also adopted a trade 
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agreement with the EU which assumed a reduction in customs rates on 
imported goods, resulting in an overall loss of customs revenue equal to around 
1.5% of GDP. 
The Serbian government continued its expansionary fiscal policy at the 
beginning of our second sub-period. In particular, in the wake of the global 
financial crisis, unprecedented hikes in public sector wages and pensions of 
around 2.5% of GDP, along with the sharp decline in government revenues, 
caused further deterioration in the fiscal balance. At the beginning of 2009 the 
Serbian government responded to its deteriorating fiscal policy stance by 
freezing public wages and pensions2 during 2009 and 2010, introducing a tax on 
mobile services, increasing excise taxes on oil and oil derivatives, and reducing 
agricultural subsidies, subsidies to state-owned enterprises, and transfers to local 
governments. These measures resulted in a relatively lower average fiscal deficit 
of 4.5% of GDP between 2009 and 2010 in comparison to new EU member 
states from Central and Eastern Europe, which recorded an average fiscal deficit 
of 6% of GDP in the same period. Most of the implemented measures were, 
however, only temporary (public wages and pensions freeze, tax on mobile 
services etc.), and the Serbian government abandoned them in 2011. In 
addition, in mid-2011 the government adopted a fiscal decentralization package 
which created vertical fiscal imbalances of approximately 1.7% of GDP (Arsić et 
al. 2012). The government also rescued several state-owned banks and 
enterprises in 2012 and 2013. Therefore, between 2011 and 2014 the fiscal 
deficit in Serbia was increasing and amounted, on average, to 5.9% of GDP, 
while in other emerging European economies the fiscal deficit constituted only 
3.4% of GDP in the same period, as a direct consequence of introduced fiscal 
austerity measures. The Serbian government started implementing systematic 
austerity measures in 2014Q4, several years later than other European 
economies. 
Consequently, deteriorating fiscal balance pushed the public-debt-to-GDP ratio 
upwards by approximately 40 percentage points between 2008Q3 and 2014Q3 –
from 30% of GDP in 2008Q3 to 68% of GDP in 2014Q3. The growth of Serbian 
                                                                
2 The average annual inflation rate in 2009 and 2010 was 8.4%, so the nominal freeze of public 
wages and pensions significantly contributed to the reduction of government spending and 
overall fiscal deficit in real terms.  
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public liabilities represents one of the fastest increases in government 
indebtedness among emerging European economies. 
At the end of 2014 the public-debt-to-GDP ratio in emerging European 
economies constituted, on average, around 52% of GDP. Serbia’s public debt 
corresponds to more than 70% of its GDP, as depicted in Figure 1 below. Figure 
1 also documents how Croatia, Hungary, and Albania were the only countries 
with higher public-debt-to-GDP ratios among emerging European economies at 
the end of same year. 
Figure 1: General Government Gross Debt (% of GDP) in Emerging European 
Economies at the end of 2014 
 
Source: IMF WEO, April 2015 
The deterioration of the primary fiscal balance from the onset of the global 
financial crisis contributed the most to the upward trend of Serbian public debt. 
Between 2008Q4 and 2010Q4 primary fiscal balance fluctuated around its mean 
value of -3.5% of GDP, while between 2011Q1 and 2014Q3 it averaged around -
3.1% of GDP. Hence the overall fiscal balance breached its medium-run bound 
of -1% of GDP, defined in fiscal rules as about 3.5 percentage points, on average. 
We document these trends in Figure 2, in which we depict the dynamics of 
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seasonally adjusted primary fiscal balance and public debt in Serbia between 
2004Q3 and 2014Q3.3 
Figure 2: Primary Fiscal Balance (% of GDP) and Public Debt (% of GDP) in 
Serbia, 2004Q3-2014Q3 
 
Sources: Ministry of Finance and the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia 
From the standpoint of public debt stability, the currency composition of 
Serbian public debt is unfavourable, since the Serbian government has issued 
80% of its debt in foreign currency. In addition, the Serbian dinar is sensitive to 
net capital flows. High current account deficits, accompanied by the sudden 
cessation of capital inflows and higher capital outflows triggered by the global 
financial crisis, caused the dinar to lose approximately 20% of its value between 
October 2008 and March 2009. In particular, given the Serbian public debt level 
of around 75% of GDP, if the dinar depreciates by 1 percentage point in 
                                                                
3  We use a data set that comprises official time series data from Ministry of Finance, the 
National Bank of Serbia, and the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia. We follow ESS 
guidelines (Eurostat 2015) in implementing the TRAMO/SEATS procedure to seasonally 
adjust the data. All data, both seasonally unadjusted and adjusted, is available from the 
authors upon request. 
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nominal terms the public-debt-to-GDP ratio increases by, on average, 0.6 
percentage points. A sensitive exchange rate, coupled with one of the most 
euroized economic systems in Central and Eastern Europe, can create additional 
contingent liabilities for the Serbian government.  
The maturity structure of Serbian government debt might also cause problems 
regarding public debt risk management. In particular, at the end of 2014 only 
14.4% of total dinar-denominated government debt had a maturity longer than 
3 years, while the corresponding share for euro-denominated government debt 
was 27.5% (Ministry of Finance 2015). The maturity composition of Serbian 
public debt, although favourable from the standpoint of total interest burden, 
bears significant rollover risks.  
According to Baldacci et al. (2011), the probability of fiscal crisis in emerging 
economies increases if, among other things, the following scenarios emerge: i) 
the cyclically adjusted primary fiscal balance exceeds a threshold of around -
0.5% of GDP; ii) general government gross debt exceeds a threshold of around 
43% of GDP; and iii) foreign-currency-denominated public debt constitutes 
more than approximately 40% of total government debt. Even if the results of 
Baldacci et al. (2011) do not hold with certainty, Maastricht Convergence 
Criteria stipulate the following conditions for Serbia’s formal accession to the 
European Union: i) a public-debt-to-GDP ratio below 60%; ii) an overall fiscal 
balance above -3% of GDP; and iii) stability of exchange rate fluctuations and 
the convergence of domestic interest rates towards the overall level of interest 
rates in the European Union. Given the trends in Serbian public finances 
documented above, we cannot rule out a fiscal crisis in Serbia in the coming 
years.  
3. GOVERNMENT BUDGET CONSTRAINT 
Since the seminal work of Hamilton and Flavin (1986), government budget 
constraint can be used as a theoretical framework for the empirical application 
of unit root tests in analysing public debt sustainability. Hence in this section we 
follow Hamilton and Flavin (1986) and Bohn (2007). 
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The value of public debt at time t is: 
�� � ��� � �� � �� � �������� (III.1) 
in which ���  represents non-interest government expenditure, ��  represents 
government revenue, �� represents interest rate, and ���� represents public debt 
from the previous period.4 
The difference 
��� � �� � ���� � ��� � �� � ������ � �� � �� (III.2) 
is the overall fiscal deficit, since �� � ��� � ������  represents overall 
government expenditure. The difference ��� � �� is primary, non-interest, fiscal 
deficit. If we shift (III.1) one period ahead and assume constant interest rates5, 
the difference equation for the public debt becomes 
�� � �������� � ����� � ����� (III.3) 
in which � � � �� � ��⁄ � � � � represents a deterministic discount factor. 
Recursive substitutions forward yield the expected present value condition for 
the public debt 
�� � ∑ ��������� � ����� ������  (III.4) 
                                                                
4  If the variables are measured in nominal terms, �� represents nominal interest rate. If the 
variables are measured in real terms, �� represents real interest rate. If the variables are 
measured in GDP shares, �� represents the interest rate (nominal or real) minus the growth 
rate (nominal or real). In the case of Serbia, �� represents the weighted average of domestic 
and foreign interest rates adjusted for exchange-rate-induced valuation gains or losses. For 
details, see Bohn (2007, page 1839). 
5  The constancy of interest rates is the most common assumption in the literature. Two other 
assumptions are: i) interest rates are uncorrelated over time with positive and constant 
conditional expectation �������� � �� � � �� ii) interest rates follow any stationary stochastic 
process with mean �� � � �. Both assumptions lead to the difference equation (II.3). For 
details, see Bohn (2007, pages 1838-1840).  
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in which discounted expected future primary fiscal balances finance current 
public debt obligations. Government budget constraint holds if the 
transversality condition 
 (III.5) 
holds. Since creditors do not tolerate the bubble build-up in public debt, the 
transversality condition represents the no-Ponzi game condition in public debt 
sustainability analysis.  
The expected present value condition and transversality condition are 
equivalent conditions (Bohn, 2007). They are consistent with the increasing 
stock of debt, as long as the rate of public debt increase is less than the interest 
rate (Hamilton and Flavin 1986). In other words, the government does not have 
to pay off its entire debt. 
To nest the null and alternative hypotheses for subsequent unit root testing and 
following Hamilton and Flavin (1986), we write the government debt valuation 
equation in its most general form 
 (III.6) 
The null hypothesis �� is 
 (III.7) 
The alternative hypothesis �� is 
 (III.8) 
Hamilton and Flavin (1986) argue that if �� is stationary, for any stationary 
process ∑ ������� ������� � ����� ��������  On the other 
hand, if  then �� is nonstationary. Stated differently, if 
public debt follows a stationary stochastic process, then the transversality 
condition holds and public debt is sustainable. On the other hand, if the 
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transversality condition does not hold, then public debt follows a nonstationary 
stochastic process and hence public debt is unsustainable. 
If public debt is integrated of order �, ����, for any finite� � �, then public 
debt satisfies the transversality condition, and debt, revenue, and expenditure 
satisfy government budgetary constraint (Bohn 2007). The n-period-ahead 
conditional expectation of an mth-order integrated stochastic process for �� is 
at most an mth-order polynomial of time horizon n.6 The discounting in the 
transversality condition is the exponential function of n. The exponential 
growth dominates polynomial growth of any order. In other words, government 
budget constraint holds regardless of the order of integration for the public debt 
process. Hence testing for the unit root in public debt becomes meaningless. 
The analysis is valid only in the long run, i.e., for infinite-horizon government 
budget constraint. In the short-to-medium run, the distinction between the 
stationary and nonstationary stochastic processes for public debt has economic 
importance, because nonstationary public debt can violate any upper bound 
that policymakers may impose (Bohn 2007). Since Serbian public debt in 
2012Q1 violated the 45% of GDP upper bound defined in fiscal rules, in the next 
section we apply a battery of unit root tests. 
4. DEBT SUSTAINABILITY TESTS 
In interpreting the results of the unit root tests we adopt the criterion of Uctum 
et al. (2006), who considered trending public debt in finite samples to be 
sustainable if and only if the underlying data generating process (DGP) was 
negative trend stationary. A downward-sloping trend does not have to imply the 
dynamic inefficiency of the government in finite samples, while stationarity 
provides the predictability of DGP. 
We present the results of an augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test 
(Dickey and Fuller 1981) in the first row of Table 1. Serbian public debt is on an 
unsustainable path, since we fail to reject a random walk with positive drift null 
hypothesis for public-debt-to-GDP ratio between 2004Q3 and 2014Q3. We 
scale public debt with GDP, since: i) GDP share is the most appropriate measure 
for growing economies, as Hakkio and Rush (1991) indicate; and ii) market 
                                                                
6  For details, see proposition 1 in Bohn (2007, page 1840). 
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participants are interested in GDP ratios, since policymakers define fiscal rules 
and other government debt measures in percentage of GDP. In determining the 
number of lags in the augmented Dickey-Fuller test regression we follow the 
general-to-specific procedure of Ng and Perron (1995), in which we set the 
initial number of lags to 4, since we analyse quarterly data. We must interpret 
the results of the ADF unit root test with caution, given the test’s low power: i) 
in the presence of close to 1 first lag autocorrelation coefficient; ii) in the 
presence of small sample bias; and iii) in the presence of structural break. 
To circumvent the issue of the 0.912 in-sample first lag autocorrelation 
coefficient, we apply the complementary KPSS stationarity test of Kwiatkowski 
et al. (1992). We reject the null hypothesis of trend stationarity at the 1% 
significance level, which the second row of Table 1 documents. Hence the 
results of the KPSS test are in accordance with the results of the ADF unit root 
test. The number of lags in the KPSS test regression equals 0, as in the ADF test 
regression. 
Table 1: ADF and KPSS Unit Root Tests (period: 2004Q3-2014Q3) 
ࢀࢋ࢙࢚ ࢚࣎ ࡷࡼࡿࡿ࢚ ࢚ ࡸࢇࢍ࢙ 
࡭ࡰࡲ -0.76 - 0.14 0 
ࡷࡼࡿࡿ - 0.96*** 0.40 0 
Notes: ߬௧  is ADF test statistics, ܭܲܵܵ௧  is KPSS test statistics, ݐ is a trend coefficient in test 
regressions. Number of lags determined in accordance with Ng and Peron (1995). *** denotes 
significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level, * denotes significance at 10% level. 
ADF test asymptotic critical values: -4.20 for 1% significance level, -3.53 for 5% significance level, 
-3.20 for 10% significance level. KPSS test asymptotic critical values: 0.22 for 1% significance level, 
0.15 for 5% significance level, and 0.12 for 10% significance level. 
To take into account the small sample bias, we implement the point-optimal 
invariant unit root tests proposed in Elliott et al. (1996), as well as the class of 
M-unit root tests proposed in Ng and Perron (2001). The results of these tests, 
presented in Table 2, are ambiguous with respect to the predictability of the 
public debt data generating process (DGP). 
While the Dickey-Fuller Generalized Least Squares (DF GLS) unit root test 
cannot reject the unit root hypothesis at any meaningful significance level, the 
Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock (ERS) Point Optimal unit root test rejects the unit root 
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hypothesis at more than a 1% significance level. In addition, modified Phillips-
Perron tests, ܯܼఈ andܯܼ௧, cannot reject the unit root hypothesis, but the 
opposite is true for modified ERS point optimal testܯ ்ܲ and modified Sargan-
Bhargava testܯܵܤ. 
Table 2: Sample Bias and Unit Root Tests (period: 2004Q3-2014Q3) 
ࢀࢋ࢙࢚ ࡿ࢚ࢇ࢚࢏࢙࢚࢏ࢉ࢙ ࡿ࢖ࢋࢉ࢏ࢌ࢏ࢉࢇ࢚࢏࢕࢔ ࡸࢇࢍ࢙ ࡯࢘࢏࢚ࢋ࢘࢏࢕࢔ 
ࡰࡲࡳࡸࡿ -0.63 Trend & Intercept 1 MAIC 
ࡱࡾࡿ 30.31*** Trend & Intercept 1 MAIC 
ࡹࢆࢻ -2.76 Trend & Intercept 1 MAIC 
ࡹࢆ࢚ -0.98 Trend & Intercept 1 MAIC 
ࡹࡼࢀ 27.26*** Trend & Intercept 1 MAIC 
ࡹࡿ࡮ 0.35*** Trend & Intercept 1 MAIC 
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level, * denotes 
significance at 10% level. Number of lags in each test determined in accordance with the modified 
AIC (MAIC), as in Ng and Perron (2001). Long-run HAC corrected variance in each test obtained 
with GLS detrended autoregressive spectral density estimator, as in Ng and Perron (2001). 
To take into account the structural break in public debt, we implement the 
Zivot-Andrews endogenous structural break unit root test (Zivot and Andrews 
1992). We test the no-break random walk null hypothesis against all three 
stationarity alternatives embodied in: i) model A, which incorporates a 
structural break in the level of the series; ii) model B, which incorporates a 
structural break in the trend of the series; iii) model C, which incorporates 
structural breaks in both the level and the trend of the series. 
We outline estimation results in Table 3. The results from Table 3 favour model 
B, although Model C describes public debt dynamics almost as well as Model B. 
Model B rejects the null hypothesis at more than a 1% significance level, and 
dates the break in 2008Q3. Model C rejects the unit root null hypothesis at a 
10% significance level, and dates the break in 2008Q2. In estimating each test 
specification, we determine the number of lags as in Ng and Perron (1995). We 
discriminate between the three test specifications by comparing their respective 
standard errors (S.E.), the values of the Akaike (AIC), Schwarz (SIC), and 
Hannan-Quinn (HQIC) information criteria. 
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Stationarity of the debt process after controlling for a break is a necessary, but 
not sufficient, condition for public debt sustainability in finite samples. The 
overall trend coefficient, calculated as the sum of trend coefficient ݐ and the 
slope dummy variableܦܶ, must be negative for the sufficient condition to hold. 
In this case, the overall trend coefficient is positive in both model B and model 
C. The overall trend coefficient in model B equals -1.45+2.52=1.07, while the 
overall trend coefficient in model C equals -1.47+2.57=1.1. According to the 
results of model B and model C, Serbian public debt increased, on average, by 1 
percentage point per quarter between 2004Q3 and 2014Q3. The estimates are in 
line with the 83.5% public-debt-to-GDP ratio projection of the Fiscal Council of 
the Republic of Serbia at the beginning of 2018 (Fiscal Council 2015). Both 
models associate the break date with the beginning of the global financial crisis 
in Serbia (Berglöf et al. 2009). Moreover, the negative signs of the trend 
coefficients before the break, coupled with the positive signs of the slope 
dummies after the break, describe the evolution of the public-debt-to-GDP ratio 
before and after the arrival of the global financial crisis in Serbia. 
The results of the unit root tests, although ambiguous from the standpoint of 
DGP predictability, unequivocally point to an upward trend in the public-debt-
to-GDP ratio, implying unsustainability of the government debt trajectory in 
Serbia in the analysed period. However, these tests have three major 
shortcomings. First, they are backward-looking, so their projections are 
conditional on current fiscal policy which might change in the future. Second, 
they have low power in differentiating between random walks and highly 
persistent AR (1) processes, especially in small samples. Third, they cannot 
answer whether, or how, primary fiscal balance relates to the dynamics of public 
debt. To overcome these shortcomings, in the next subsection we estimate FRFs 
for the primary fiscal balance and public debt. 
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Table 3: Zivot-Andrews Unit Root Test (period: 2004Q3-2014Q3) 
 
Notes: Values in the tZA column are the values of Zivot-Andrews test statistic. Values in columns t, 
DU and DT are coefficients for trend, shift level dummy and slope dummy. Associated t -statistics 
are given in ( ). The number of lags determined as in Ng and Perron (1995). *** denotes 
significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level, * denotes significance at 10% level. 
Asymptotic critical values for 1%, 5% and 10% significance level are: model A: -5.34, -4.80, -4.58; 
model B: -4.93, -4.42, -4.11; model C: -5.57, -5.08 and -4.82. 
5. FISCAL REACTION FUNCTIONS 
FRFs quantify the response of primary fiscal balance to changes in public debt. 
Bohn (1998) claims how a positive, at least linear, statistically significant 
response of primary fiscal balance to public debt accumulation is sufficient to 
imply mean reversion in a stochastic process for public debt. Bohn’s 
argumentation for estimating FRFs is twofold. First, the unit root testing of 
government budget constraint relies on simplifying assumptions about the 
behaviour of interest rates. In particular, the constancy of interest rates implies 
risk-neutral private investors. FRFs in Bohn (1998), on the other hand, do not 
depend on interest rates. Second, unit root test regressions are prone to omitted 
variable bias, since they are not grounded in any theoretical framework of fiscal 
policy behaviour. FRFs in Bohn (1998), however, stem from Barro’s (1979) tax-
smoothing model. In this model, policymakers first set the level of permanent 
government spending. Exogenous permanent government spending determines 
the level of collected tax revenue. In collecting taxes, the government fixes the 
tax rate to minimize the administrative costs of tax collection and the 
deadweight cost of taxation incurred by the taxpayers. Consequently, transitory 
government spending, as a consequence of wars, political and business cycles, 
and output gap, via its impact on the tax base, are the only non-debt 
ࡴࡽࡵ࡯ 
3.94 
3.74 
3.80 
ࡿࡵ࡯ 
4.05 
3.88 
3.97 
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ࡿǤࡱǤ 
1.61 
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ࡸࢇࢍ࢙ 
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1 
1 
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- 
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2.57 
(5.04) 
ࡰࢁ 
-5.17 
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- 
-2.97 
(-2.03) 
࢚ 
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-1.45 
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࢚ࢆ࡭ 
-3.41 
-5.4*** 
-4.98* 
࡮࢘ࢋࢇ࢑ 
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2008Q3 
2008Q2 
ࡹ࢕ࢊࢋ࢒ 
A 
B 
C 
60
Economic Annals, Volume LXI, No. 210 / July – September 2016
determinants of the primary fiscal balance. The expected sign of transitory 
government spending on primary fiscal balance is negative, while the expected 
sign of output gap on primary fiscal balance is positive.  
Following Bohn (1998), we estimate the following OLS regression: 
�� � � � �������� � ������� � ������� � ������ � �� (V.1) 
in which �� represents primary fiscal balance, ���� is lagged public debt, ����� 
is transitory government spending, �����  is output gap, and �� are i.i.d. normal 
white noise residuals with parameters � and ��. ������	is a dummy variable 
which equals 1 if	� � ������	, and 0 otherwise. All regressors are in % of GDP, 
except �����, which is in log levels, as in Uctum et al. (2006). We compute 
�����  as the detrended values of nominal government expenditure, and then 
divide the corresponding transitory component by nominal GDP. �����	is 
calculated by detrending the values of log real GDP.7 According to the results of 
the unit root tests, the process for �� is trend-stationary, so we do not test for the 
cointegration between �� and ��.8 
We present the coefficient estimates from equation (V.1) in Table 4 below. Table 
4 shows how the estimated response of primary fiscal balance to a 1-percentage 
point increase in public debt is 0.05 percentage points. The estimated response is 
significant at more than 1% significance level. We use lagged public debt as an 
explanatory variable for two reasons. First, we circumvent potential correlation 
between contemporaneous public debt and the unexplained variations of primary 
fiscal balance. Second, we allow the additional quarter for the corrective fiscal 
actions of the government in repaying the debt principal. Although the positive 
response of primary fiscal balance to public debt in Table 4 implies mean 
reversion in the stochastic process for public debt, we must analyse the magnitude 
of the estimated response in connection with the results of the unit root tests from 
the previous subsection. The estimated response of 0.05 percentage points in 
                                                                
7  We use Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter with smoothing parameter set to 1,600 in both 
calculations. 
8  The first lag autocorrelation coefficient for ��  equals 0.512. The ADF test rejects the random 
walk with a drift unit root hypothesis at more than 1% significance level. The results are 
available from the authors upon request. 
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Table 4 is insufficient to mean revert the public-debt-to-GDP ratio in the short-
to-medium run, given the 1.07 percentage point estimate for the overall debt 
trend coefficient in Table 3. 
The global financial crisis has increased the share of primary fiscal deficit in 
GDP by 3.65 percentage points, as the estimated coefficient for the dummy 
variable ������	in Table 4 indicates. Transitory government spending and 
output gap also have the expected signs and a satisfactory statistical significance. 
In particular, the percentage point increase (decrease) of general government 
expenditure as % of GDP from its overall trend level reduced (increased) the 
share of primary fiscal balance in GDP by 0.91 percentage points. In addition, 
the percentage point increase (decrease) of real GDP from its potential level 
increased (reduced) the share of primary fiscal balance in GDP by 0.11 
percentage points. The estimation results are robust with respect to the Newey-
West correction. The results are also robust with respect to the simultaneity bias 
between primary fiscal balance on the one hand and transitory government 
spending and output gap on the other, since the respective correlations with the 
residuals in equation (V.1) are indistinguishable from zero. Our estimates do 
not change even when we instrument �����	with its lagged value. The 
instrument is not weakly identified, since the Cragg-Donald F-statistic equals 
13.69. In addition, the Hausman simultaneity test cannot reject the exogeneity 
of output gap at the 13% significance level.9 We have also experimented with 
additional explanatory variables, most notably with contemporaneous and 
lagged trade balance, inflation rate, and lagged primary fiscal balance. Trade 
balance and its lagged value fail to capture the effect of absorption gap on 
primary fiscal balance through the impact on government revenue, most 
probably because output gap and global financial crisis have already 
encompassed it. We have also omitted inflation rate from the final specification, 
since its effect has been statistically insignificant. Lagged primary fiscal balance 
fails to capture the persistence in the stochastic process for	��, so it does not 
figure in equation (V.1) and Table 4. 
                                                                
9  We have also experimented with potential instruments for transitory government spending, 
but we believe there is no relevant economic rationale which might explain the influence of 
primary fiscal balance on transitory government spending on a quarterly basis, particularly 
for the period we consider and under the theoretical foundations on which we base our 
empirical estimates.  
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Table 4: FRF with the Global Financial Crisis (period: 2004Q3-2014Q3) 
��������� ������������ ��������������� � � ����. 
� -1.95*** 0.60 (0.52) 
-3.22 
���.�6� 
������ -3.65*** 0.24 (0.24) 
-15.18 
��1�.4�� 
����� -0.91*** 0.07 (0.06) 
-12.73 
��14.�0� 
����� 11.23** 6.72 (4.96) 
1.67 
�2.26� 
���� 0.05*** 0.01 (0.01) 
3.75 
�4.09� 
�� 0.93 �. �. 0.73 
� � ����. 117.32 �� 1.89 
Notes: Estimates are from equation (V.1). The dependent variable ��  is primary fiscal balance as 
% of GDP. � is a constant term. ������ is a dummy variable which equals 1 if � � 200����, and 0 
otherwise. ���� is one quarter lagged public debt, �����  is transitory government spending, and 
�����  is output gap. All regressors expressed in % of GDP, except �����, which is in log levels, 
as in Uctum et al. (2006). Newey-West HAC standard errors, obtained using Bartlett kernel with 
lag window of size 4, are given in (). Newey-West HAC corrected �-statistics are given in []. 
Estimates obtained using OLS estimation method. *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes 
significance at 5% level and * denotes significance at 10% level for HAC corrected standard errors. 
To put things into perspective, we compare the estimated coefficient for ���� 
from Table 4 with the responses of primary fiscal balance obtained elsewhere in 
the literature for approximately the same considered period. Afonso and Jalles 
(2015) estimate FRFs for 11 European economies for the period 1999Q1-
2013Q4. Table 5 outlines the results of the comparison. 
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Table 5: Cross-Country Comparison of FRFs 
࡯࢕࢛࢔࢚࢘࢟ ࡲࡾࡲ࢘ࢋ࢙࢖࢕࢔࢙ࢋ ࡸ࢕࢔ࢍ െ ࢛࢘࢔࢘ࢋ࢒ࢇ࢚࢏࢕࢔࢙ࢎ࢏࢖ 
Austria 
Belgium 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
Serbia 
0.010 NO 
0.152*** YES 
0.077 NO 
0.096*** YES 
0.127** YES 
0.031 NO 
0.136 NO 
0.059 NO 
0.296*** YES 
0.017 NO 
0.061 NO 
0.05*** NO 
Notes: Estimates for 11 European economies for the period 1999Q1-2013Q4 are from Afonso and 
Jalles (2015), Table 4, page 15. Estimates for Serbia for the period 2004Q3-2014Q3 are authors’ 
calculations. *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level and * denotes 
significance at 10% level for HAC corrected standard errors. 
Estimates from Table 5 indicate how fiscal policy is sustainable in Belgium, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Serbia, since the response of primary 
fiscal balance to public debt accumulation is positive and statistically significant. 
This finding becomes more intuitive when we take into account the presence of 
the long-run cointegrating relationship between primary fiscal balance and 
public debt in Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. Primary fiscal 
balance and public debt have the same degree of persistence in these countries. 
Moreover, they co-move in a synchronized manner towards long-run 
equilibrium. Afonso and Jalles (2015) confirm this result both with the 
Johansen-Juselius procedure and with the dynamic ordinary least squares 
method of Stock, Watson, and Shin. In Serbia, however, the process for public 
debt exhibits (near) unit root behaviour, while the process for primary fiscal 
balance belongs to a class of stationary stochastic processes. Hence shocks to 
public debt are more persistent than shocks to primary fiscal balance. In other 
words, changes in public debt have a more lasting effect in the system than 
changes in primary fiscal balance. To shed more light on this issue, we proceed 
in two directions. First, we investigate whether and how the response of primary 
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fiscal balance changes when public debt accelerates towards higher debt levels. 
Second, we investigate whether and how the response of primary fiscal balance 
changes when, due to an exogenous crisis shock, debt reverses its trend from 
downward-sloping to upward-sloping. 
FRF in (V.1) measures the response of primary fiscal balance to linear changes 
in public debt. The positive linear response is only a sufficient and not a 
necessary condition for fiscal sustainability. A non-linear and/or time-varying 
response can also support fiscal solvency, as long as the response is strictly 
positive above a certain debt-output ratio (Mendoza and Ostry 2008). In other 
words, for the condition to be necessary it must persevere at higher debt levels 
as well. Therefore, Bohn (1998) estimates FRFs when: i) public debt is above a 
certain threshold; ii) public debt accelerates at a quadratic rate; iii) public debt 
increases at a cubic rate. He finds, in the case of the United States between 1916 
and 1985, a stronger response of primary fiscal balance to public debt 
accumulation in the situations mentioned above. Ghosh et al. (2011), contrary 
to the results of Bohn (1998), argue in favour of the fiscal fatigue hypothesis. 
According to this hypothesis, the response of primary fiscal balance at higher 
public debt levels fades away. Ghosh et al. (2011) explain this relationship with a 
cubic polynomial: at low levels of public debt there is no, or even a negative, 
relationship between the primary fiscal balance and public debt. As public debt 
increases, the primary fiscal balance also increases. The response eventually 
weakens, and finally decreases at high levels of debt (Ghosh et al. 2011). The 
result is intuitive, since it becomes more challenging for the government to push 
for corrective action on both sides of the budget at higher levels of debt. 
Figure 3 shows a scatter plot of primary fiscal balance and public debt in which 
we fit quadratic and cubic polynomials to motivate a discussion. Below 
approximately 45% of the GDP public debt threshold, which interestingly 
enough corresponds to an upper public debt bound defined in fiscal rules, there 
is no relationship between primary fiscal balance and public debt. Above the 
threshold, the relationship becomes positive. Around the 54% public-debt-to-
GDP threshold, the relationship starts to weaken. The threshold is in line with 
the results of Mendoza and Ostry (2008), who find a 50%-of-GDP threshold in a 
panel of emerging economies between 1990 and 2005. The overall pattern 
appears consistent with the fiscal fatigue hypothesis.  
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Figure 3: Scatterplot of Public Debt and Primary Fiscal Balance with 
Polynomial Fits in Serbia, 2004Q3-2014Q3 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
We estimate three additional FRFs to explore stylized facts from the data. First, 
following Plödt and Reicher (2014) and Snower et al. (2011), we estimate a FRF 
with ����∗  public debt variable in which	��∗ equals	max��� �� � ���. We opt for 
a 45%-of-GDP threshold because of the upper public debt bound defined in 
fiscal rules. We do not experiment with higher public-debt-to-GDP ratios 
because of the insufficient number of sample points corresponding to the values 
above certain thresholds. Second, following Bohn (1998), we estimate a FRF 
with quadratic polynomial in public debt. Third, following Mendoza and Ostry 
(2008) and Ghosh et al. (2011), we estimate a FRF with cubic polynomial in 
public debt.  
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Table 6 outlines the estimation results. The first column shows the results from 
estimating FRF with 45%-of-GDP public debt threshold. The second column 
shows the results of estimating FRF with a quadratic polynomial in public debt. 
The third column shows the results from estimating FRF with a cubic 
polynomial in public debt. We caution the reader to interpret the estimation 
results carefully due to potential overfitting and multicollinearity issues.  
The results are, however, consistent with the patterns in Figure 3. The estimated 
coefficient for� ��� in the first column of Table 6 is statistically insignificant and 
equals 0.01, while the estimated coefficient for� ���∗  is significant at the 10% 
level and equals 0.08. Hence the government takes additional corrective action 
when the public-debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds the 45% threshold. The government 
signals to creditors how it implements fiscal adjustment measures when faced 
with a fiscal rule breach. In comparison to our baseline estimates from Table 4, 
the response of primary fiscal balance to public debt accumulation strengthens 
by only 0.03 percentage points after the fiscal rule breach. Hence the response is 
still insufficient to mean revert the accelerating debt dynamics, given the 
estimates of the overall debt trend coefficient in Table 3. The absence of 
stronger corrective government action can jeopardize future fiscal 
consolidations, since the magnitude of adjustment, along with its expected 
persistence, is the most important characteristic of successful fiscal 
consolidation, at least according to Giavazzi and Pagano (1990). 
The coefficient for ����� from the second column of Table 6, statistically 
significant at the 5% level, equals only 0.002, implying almost no response of 
primary fiscal balance at higher debt levels. In addition, the coefficient for �����  
from the third column of Table 6, significant at the 10% level, is 
indistinguishable from zero, providing further evidence in favour of the fiscal 
fatigue hypothesis in the case of Serbia.10 In other words, changes in primary 
fiscal balance cannot keep pace with changes in public debt when the debt 
accelerates towards higher debt levels. 
                                                                
10  We have also estimated FRFs with reduced quadratic and cubic polynomials. The response of 
primary fiscal balance to ����� equals 0.0006, significant at 1% level. The response of primary 
fiscal balance to ����� equals 0.000009, significant at 1% level. The results are available from 
the authors upon request. 
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Table 6: FRFs with Debt Fatigue (period: 2004Q3-2014Q3) 
��������� ������� ��� ���������������� ������������ 
� 
-0.56 
(1.05) 
[0.99] 
2.63 
(2.37) 
[2.07] 
14.75* 
(8.66) 
[7.56] 
������ 
-3.72*** 
(0.24) 
[0.22] 
-3.76*** 
(0.24) 
[0.21] 
-3.69*** 
(0.24) 
[0.24] 
����� 
-0.91*** 
(0.07) 
[0.06] 
-0.91*** 
(0.069) 
[0.060] 
-0.91*** 
(0.068) 
[0.06] 
����� 
7.24 
(7.03) 
[5.62] 
6.58 
(6.86) 
[5.62] 
6.76 
(6.76) 
[5.98] 
���� 
0.01 
(0.027) 
[0.027] 
-0.16* 
(0.11) 
[0.09] 
-1.07* 
(0.63) 
[0.54] 
�����   
0.002** 
(0.0012) 
[0.0010] 
0.024* 
(0.015) 
[0.012] 
�����    
-0.000164* 
(0.0001) 
[0.00009] 
����∗  
0.08* 
(0.047) 
[0.043] 
  
��������� � 0.93 0.93 0.93 
�� �� 0.71 0.70 0.69 
�� 2.03 2.06 2.11 
��� 2.30 2.26 2.25 
��� 2.55 2.51 2.54 
���� 2.40 2.35 2.35 
Notes: ��-primary fiscal balance as % of GDP is the dependent variable. �-constant term; ������-
dummy variable which equals 1 if � � �������, and 0 otherwise; �����-transitory government 
spending; ����� -output gap;���� -lagged public debt; ��∗ -max��� �� � ��� . All regressors 
expressed in % of GDP, except ����� , which is in log levels as in Uctum et al. (2006). ()-ordinary 
standard errors; []-Newey-West HAC standard errors, with Bartlett lag window of 4. OLS 
estimation method. *** significance at 1% level, ** significance at 5% level and * significance at 
10% level for HAC corrected standard errors. 
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We also evaluate the marginal response of primary fiscal balance to public debt 
at different levels of public debt from quadratic and cubic FRFs. Table 7 outlines 
our estimates. The estimates support the stylized facts in Figure 3 and the results 
in Table 6, at least when we focus on the marginal response of primary fiscal 
balance at the following public debt-to-GDP thresholds: 24.97% (minimum 
threshold), 45% (fiscal rule threshold), 50% (Mendoza and Ostry threshold for a 
panel of emerging economies), and 67.94% (maximum threshold).  
Table 7: Marginal Responses of Primary Fiscal Balance for Alternative 
Debt Thresholds (period: 2004Q3-2014Q3) 
������������� ��� ����������� ��������  ����� ��� 
��������� -0.06 0.02 0.04 0.11 
����� -0.18 0.09 0.10 -0.08 
Notes: Marginal response from quadratic FRF calculated as ��� �����⁄ � �0.1� � 0.004����. 
Marginal response from cubic FRF calculated as ��� �����⁄ � �1.0� � 0.04����� �
0.0004�2����� . Thresholds (% of GDP): min (24.97%), fiscal rule (45%), Mendoza & Ostry (50%), 
max (67.94%). 
We follow the sequential estimation algorithm of Bai (1997) to answer whether 
the response of primary fiscal balance to public debt changes after a reversal in 
debt trend due to an exogenous crisis shock. 
The specification for FRF along the lines of Bai (1997) is:  
 
in which we introduce the lagged dependent variable ����  to model the 
persistence in the stochastic process of primary fiscal balance, as in Uctum et al. 
(2006). 11  The 95% confidence interval for the break date is �200��4 �
200��2� . We calculate the confidence interval for the case of trending 
regressors, as in Bai (1997), according to the formula ��̂� � ������� � 1� �̂� �
������� � 1��� in which �̂� is the estimated break date, ������� is the integer part of 
�����, � is the 97.5th quintile from the symmetric case CDF for which � � 11� 
                                                                
11  We opt for lagged primary fiscal balance instead of Newey-West HAC correction, given the 
problems with the estimation of long-run variance in small samples. 
�� � � � �0���1 � �1����� � �2����� � �3���1�2004�4�200��4� �
��������� �4���1�200��1�2014�3� � �� .        (V.2) 
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and ܮ෠௜ ൌ ሺሺߙොଵ െ ߙොଶሻଶܤ௧ଶ௧መ೔షభሻȀߪఢଶ is a scale factor with ߙොଵ, ߙොଶǡ and ߪఢଶ defined as 
the public debt coefficient before the break point, public debt coefficient after 
the break point, and the estimated variance of ߳௧ from (V.2), respectively. The 
use of symmetric CDF is appropriate, since the model’s residuals are stationary 
on the whole sample. The results of both the ADF and KPSS test confirm this 
finding.12 
We outline the results of the estimation in Table 8. The budget constraint of the 
Serbian government has deteriorated more since the onset of the global financial 
crisis. For the period before the break, the average response of primary fiscal 
balance to a 1 percentage point increase in public debt equaled 0.15 percentage 
points. The response is statistically significant at more than 1% significance 
level. For the period after the break, the average response has dropped to 0.05 
percentage points. The response is again significant at more than 1% 
significance level. Hence the responsiveness of primary fiscal balance to public 
debt accumulation has diminished since the beginning of the global financial 
crisis. The drop in response is primarily due to: the 2008 trade agreement with 
the EU that resulted in a loss of customs revenue of around 1.5% of GDP; hikes 
in public wages and pensions of around 2.5% of GDP in the wake of the global 
financial crisis; a recession-induced automatic sharp decline in government 
revenue due to the global financial meltdown; fiscal decentralization measures 
from 2011 that created vertical fiscal imbalances of approximately 1.7% of GDP; 
and the government bailout of several state-owned banks and enterprises in 
2012 and 2013. Hence the size of the discrepancy between the two estimated 
coefficients shows the lack of fiscal consolidation measures in Serbia after the 
outbreak of the global financial crisis.  
                                                                
12  The ADF test statistic with intercept equals -5.02, while the corresponding KPSS test statistic 
equals 0.08. The results are available from the authors upon request. 
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Table 8: FRF with Debt Reversal (period: 2004Q3-2014Q3) 
��������� ������������ ��������������� � � ����� 
� -6.24*** 0.64 -9.78 
���� -0.16** 0.07 -2.27 
����� -0.88*** 0.07 -13.06 
����� 21.06*** 6.39 3.29 
������������������� 0.15*** 0.02 9.54 
������������������� 0.05*** 0.01 4.20 
�� 0.94 �� �� 0.68 
� � ����� 110.36 ������� � ����� � 0.00 
Notes: Estimates are from equation (V.2). The dependent variable ��  is primary fiscal balance as % of 
GDP. �-constant term; ����-lagged public debt; �����-transitory government spending; �����-
output gap. All regressors expressed in % of GDP, except �����, which is in log levels as in Uctum 
et al. (2006). Bai’s sequential estimation algorithm with 25% sample trimming percentage dates break 
in 2009Q1. OLS estimation procedure with breakpoints as in Bai (1997). *** denotes significance at 
1% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level and * denotes significance at 10% level. 
We compare the coefficients from Table 8 with estimates obtained elsewhere in 
the literature to explain differences in fiscal policy conduct between Serbia and 
other European economies before and during the global financial crisis. Afonso 
and Jalles (2015) estimate the time varying vector autoregression (VAR) model 
to capture the changes in fiscal policy behaviour before and during the global 
financial crisis in the 11 European economies in Table 5. Time varying 
coefficient estimates of Afonso and Jalles (2015) show how fiscal policy stance 
were deteriorating in the considered European economies long before the onset 
of the global financial crisis: the global financial crisis just exacerbated already 
present fiscal challenges. All the aforementioned countries, however, 
implemented fiscal consolidation programmes after the crisis. The Serbian 
government has not yet implemented measures of a similar magnitude (Fiscal 
Council 2015). 
To put a single number on the patterns discussed in the previous passage, we 
compare the estimated FRF response for Serbia from Table 8 with FRF responses 
for different groups of European countries. Baldi and Staehr (2013) provide 
estimates of FRFs for different groups of European economies before and after the 
global financial crisis. Since the estimates are for panels of countries, reported 
coefficients imply average FRF responses in the groups of economies.  
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Table 9 shows the results of the comparison. While the response of primary 
fiscal balance to debt accumulation across different groups of European 
economies has strengthened since the outbreak of the global financial crisis, 
both in terms of magnitude and in terms of statistical significance, it is just the 
opposite in the case of Serbia. This result holds even when we focus on the 
comparison between Serbia and the different groups of Central and Eastern 
Europe countries (CEE10, CEEnon7, CEEcris3). The results are, therefore, 
consistent with the estimates of Afonso and Jalles (2015). 
Table 9: FRFs Before and After the Global Financial Crisis 
࡯࢕࢛࢔࢚࢘࢏ࢋ࢙ ૛૙૙૚ࡽ૚ െ ૛૙૙ૡࡽ૛ ૛૙૙ૢࡽ૚ െ ૛૙૚૛ࡽ૜ 
EU27 0.042 0.191*** 
EA12 0.030 0.255*** 
DSU3 -0.028 0.139*** 
CEE10 0.032 0.138*** 
EAnon7 0.030 0.215*** 
EAcris5 0.034 0.242*** 
CEEnon7 0.017 0.137*** 
CEEcris3 0.207*** 0.375*** 
Serbia 0.150*** 0.05*** 
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level and * denotes 
significance at 10% level. Estimates for Serbia for the period 2004Q3-2014Q3 are authors’ 
calculations. Estimates for groups of European economies are from Baldi and Staehr (2013). 
Abbreviations from Baldi and Staehr (2013): EU27-all 27 EU countries; EA12-the first 12 euro 
area countries from Western Europe (BE, DE, IE, GR, ES, FR, IT, LU, NL, AT, PT, FI); DSU3-the 
3 countries in the EU15 that are not members of the euro area (DK, SE, UK); CEE10-the 10 EU 
countries from Central and Eastern Europe (BG, CZ, EE, LV, LT, HU, PL, RO, SI, SK); EAnon7-
the 7 countries from EA12 with limited fiscal problems (BE, DE, FR, LU, NL, AT, FI); EAcris5-the 
5 countries from EA12 with substantial fiscal problems (IE, GR, ES, IT, PT); CEEnon7-the 7 
countries from CEE10 with limited fiscal problems (BG, EE, LT, CZ, PL, SI, SK); CEE cris3-the 3 
countries from CEE10 with substantial fiscal problems (LV, HU, RO). The country abbreviations 
are the official EU abbreviations. 
However, fiscal developments in Serbia between 2000 and 2008 are not directly 
comparable with fiscal developments in other European economies. Serbia 
entered the process of transition after the year 2000, relatively late compared 
with other CEE economies. The Extended Arrangement with the IMF between 
2002 and 2005, the externally fuelled output gap and absorption boom, the 
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public debt write-offs by the London and Paris club of creditors, and the use of 
privatization proceeds for deficit financing represent the main reasons why 
fiscal policy stance in Serbia appeared sustainable before the crisis. These 
developments, however, led policymakers to conduct procyclical expansionary 
fiscal policy, thus creating the structural discrepancy between government 
revenue and expenditure between 2006 and 2008. 13  It would be more 
appropriate, therefore, to compare the results for Serbia with FRF estimates for 
other Western Balkan economies. Koczan (2015) and Baldi and Staehr (2013) 
give the unavailability of time series data as the most important reason for the 
lack of such studies. The comparisons we have made, however, are not 
completely groundless. Lewis (2013) documents how fiscal loosening in CEE 
economies started between 1999 and 2001, especially after the Nice Treaty had 
been agreed upon in 2001. Von Hagen and Wolff (2006) make an even stronger 
claim: advanced European economies engaged in creative accounting practices 
by covering large fiscal deficits with stock-flow adjustments after the Stability 
and Growth Pact was agreed upon in 1998. Hence Serbia is not the only 
European economy in which non-economic factors have determined the 
behaviour of fiscal policy from the year 2000 onward. 
6. CONCLUSION 
We have analysed the behaviour of primary fiscal balance and public debt in 
Serbia before and during the global financial crisis. Our findings can be 
summarized as follows. First, public-debt-to-GDP ratio exhibited (near) unit 
root behaviour with an overall upward time trend between 2004Q3 and 2014Q3, 
i.e., the trajectory of the Serbian public-debt-to-GDP ratio is unsustainable in 
the analysed period. The Extended Arrangement with the IMF, externally 
fuelled output gap and absorption boom, and debt write-offs by the Paris and 
London club of creditors caused government debt as percentage of GDP to 
decline between 2004Q3 and 2008Q3. However, between 2006 and 2008, when 
the Serbian economy experienced rapid expansion, policymakers 
simultaneously cut taxes and increased government spending, which resulted in 
high structural fiscal deficit. In addition, in the wake of the global financial 
                                                                
13  The emergence of a structural fiscal deficit took place in the first half of 2006, immediately 
after the Extended Arrangement with the IMF had expired, pointing to the weakness of fiscal 
institutions in Serbia during the transition period. 
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crisis, when government revenue declined sharply, policymakers increased 
public wages and pensions by approximately 2.5% of GDP. In 2009 and 2010 the 
government adopted a package of fiscal consolidation measures: a public wages 
and pensions freeze, several tax hikes, and simultaneous spending cuts, which 
resulted in relatively lower average fiscal deficit in comparison to other 
emerging European economies during the global financial crisis. However, most 
of these measures were temporary and were ended by the government in 2011. 
Moreover, in mid-2011 the government adopted fiscal decentralization 
measures which created vertical fiscal imbalances of around 1.7% of GDP. The 
government also bailed out several state-owned banks and enterprises in 2012 
and 2013, thus failing to implement systematic fiscal austerity measures. 
Consequently, between 2011 and 2014 the fiscal deficit in Serbia increased with 
respect to its average level during the global financial crisis between 2009 and 
2010. Overall, fiscal consolidation measures adopted in the aftermath of the 
global financial crisis between 2011 and 2014 were unable to mean revert the 
upward public debt trajectory. Second, we have confirmed the relevance of fiscal 
fatigue hypothesis in the case of Serbian public debt. The Serbian government 
increased its efforts to repay the debt principal after the fiscal rule breach in 
2012Q1. The effort, however, has not been persistent, since the government has 
failed to contain the accelerating public debt dynamic. Third, the response of 
primary fiscal balance to public debt accumulation has dropped sharply since 
the onset of the global financial crisis. The drop in this response is more severe 
than in other European economies. Both panel and time series evidence from 
the literature available to us support this claim. 
The Serbian government launched a massive 3-year fiscal consolidation package 
in 2014Q4. Our analysis does not take into account these fiscal developments. 
Although the primary fiscal balance improved significantly in 2015, future 
analyses must wait additional data to evaluate whether the trajectory of public-
debt-to-GDP ratio has been reversed. Consequently, a detailed investigation of 
how to restore the responsiveness of primary fiscal balance to public debt 
accumulation is the most important research priority from a policymaking 
perspective. 
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